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Abstract Multicellular organisms contain numerous symbiotic microorganisms, collec-
tively called microbiomes. Recently, microbiomic research has shown that these
microorganisms are responsible for the proper functioning of many of the systems (di-
gestive, immune, nervous, etc.) of multicellular organisms. This has inclined some scholars
to argue that it is about time to reconceptualise the organism and to develop a concept that
would place the greatest emphasis on the vital role of microorganisms in the life of plants
and animals. We believe that, unfortunately, there is a problem with this suggestion, since
there is no such thing as a universal concept of the organism which could constitute a basis
for all biological sciences. Rather, the opposite is true: numerous alternative definitions
exist. Therefore, comprehending how microbiomics is changing our understanding of
organisms may be a very complex matter. In this paper we will demonstrate that this
pluralism proves that claims about a change in our understanding of organisms can be
treated as both true and untrue. Mainly, we assert that the existing concepts differ sub-
stantially, and that only some of them have to be reconsidered in order to incorporate the
discoveries of microbiomics, while others are already flexible enough to do so. Taking into
account the plurality of conceptualisations within different branches of modern biology, we
will conduct our discussion using the developmental and the cooperation–conflict concepts
of the organism. Then we will explain our results by referring to the recent philosophical
debate on the nature of the concept of the organism within biology.
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1 Introduction
Multicellular organisms, which we will refer to here as macrobes, following O’Malley and
Dupre (2007), contain numerous symbiotic microorganisms, collectively called micro-
biomes (Lederberg 2000; Zilber-Rosenberg and Rosenberg 2008), within their bodies. It is
worth noting that the number of microorganisms forming a microbiome is often equal to
the number of cells that make up the macrobe’s body (Sender et al. 2016). Furthermore, the
role of symbiotic entities in the functioning of macrobes has recently been the object of
intensive research, which has led to many interesting discoveries: for example, that the
presence of some microorganisms is necessary for the proper development of the immune
system (Mazmanian et al. 2005), functioning of the nervous system (Carabotti et al. 2015),
and digestion of necessary nutrients (Ley et al. 2006), and that some microbes may even be
the agents responsible for the evolution of new species (Sharon et al. 2010; Brucker and
Bordenstein 2013). Due to this extraordinary role, some biologists have even suggested
that microorganisms living in symbiosis in and on human bodies should be collectively
regarded as a new organ (Baquero and Nombela 2012; Clarke et al. 2014).
Those discoveries have led some to suggest that, given the essential role of microor-
ganisms in the functionality of macrobes, microbiomic research is changing our under-
standing of the concept of the organism1 within biology, and that it is high time to
reconsider this concept so as to include symbiotic microorganisms (Sleator 2010; Gilbert
et al. 2012; McFall-Ngai et al. 2013). For instance, Sleator (2010) stated: ‘For years our
traditional view of ‘self’ was restricted to our own bodies, composed of eukaryote cells
encoded by our genome. However, in the era of omic technologies and systems biology,
this view now extends beyond the traditional limitations of our own core being to include
our resident microbial communities.’ McFall-Ngai et al. (2013) argued in the same vein
that: ‘These new data are demanding a re-examination of the very concepts of what
constitutes a genome, a population, an environment and an organism’. Obviously, there is
something important going on in biology, as microbiomics calls many standard views into
question. But are these discoveries really so momentous that we can no longer think about
organisms in the old way, as these scholars suggest?
We believe that we should really be very careful when making such statements, because
there is no such thing as a single universal concept of the organism which could constitute
a basis for all biological sciences. There is no single ‘old way’ of thinking about organisms.
Rather, in biology, numerous alternative concepts of the organism exist (Pepper and
Herron 2008; Queller and Strasmann 2009; Clarke 2010). Therefore, understanding how
microbiomics is changing our understanding of organisms may not be so easy. How should
we deal with this situation? We can envision two plausible scenarios. According to the
first, these different conceptualisations, though they may differ substantially, all respond to
the research on microbiomes in the same way. Each will have to be reconsidered in order to
incorporate ongoing discoveries. If so, then research on microbiomes may change the way
organisms are understood within biology. This point was made by Gilbert et al. (2012),
who argued that all concepts of organisms are called into question by recent discoveries in
the field of microbiomics. According to the second scenario, the various conceptualisations
respond differently to ongoing discoveries. If true, this may undermine the statement that
1 The meaning of the words organism and individual has never been clear in biology. Therefore, we use
them interchangeably following the majority of scholars (see Pepper and Herron 2008; Gilbert et al. 2012;
Clarke 2013). To refer to different definitions of organism/individual, we will use adjectives: for example,
genetic organism/individual, immunological organism/individual, etc.
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biology is undergoing change in its understanding of organisms, since one concept of the
organism may have to be rejected, while another concept can easily deal with the results of
microbiomics research. This would ensure that changes in the way of thinking about
organisms are local, i.e. mostly constrained to certain concepts which cannot manage to
incorporate the ongoing discoveries.
In this paper we will argue in favour of the latter scenario. Mainly, we will show that
even though research on microbiomes is spectacular, it does not influence every concept of
the organism in the same way. To prove this point, in the next section, we will analyse two
concepts of the organism to show that they respond differently to microbiome research.
Then we will explain our results by referring to the recent philosophical debate on the
nature of the concept of the organism within biology.
2 Microbiomics and Concepts of the Organism
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the concept of the organism has been a centre of
interest in recent years for both biologists and philosophers. A great deal of work has been
done on answering the question ‘What is an organism?’ (Clarke 2010, 2013; Queller and
Strasmann 2009, 2016). This might be surprising at first glance, because we all intuitively
think we know what organisms really are: a kind of functional cohesive whole. Cats are
organisms, stones are not. Apes are organisms, a river is not. The motivation for this work
is, however, entirely justified and derives from one basic fact: namely, that it is sometimes
very hard to decide whether a given object is an autonomous organism or merely a part of
another organism (Wilson 2000; Pepper and Herron 2008; Clarke 2010). Of course, this is
not at all problematic when we deal with species like cats; there are good reasons to say
that a cat’s heart is just a part of the cat. However, there are examples that have been
puzzling scientists for decades. For instance, should we consider an entire ant colony to be
one big organism, or should we, perhaps, grant the status of an organism to each ant?
In light of such problematic cases, scholars have developed many different approaches
toward defining organisms. For instance, we have concepts, based on genetics, that indi-
viduate organisms by suggesting that an organism is something that possesses a unique
genotype (see Santelices 1999). Other scholars focus on the process of reproduction, which
is supposed to mark the distinction between individuals and non-individuals, by arguing
that an organism is something that comes from a fertilised egg (see for instance Janzen
1977; Slack 2005, p. 6). Still other thinkers argue that organisms are objects capable of
evolution via natural selection (see Clarke 2013; Godfrey-Smith 2009). And these three
examples are just the tip of the iceberg. For instance, Clarke (2010) listed 13 definitions of
the organism. Due to lack of space, we obviously cannot analyse all of them here;
therefore, we have chosen two, as sufficient to make our point clearly: the developmental
concept of the organism and the cooperation–conflict concept of the organism. Our choice
is motivated by the fact the former is more concrete, the latter more abstract. Therefore, we
suppose that the latter, due to its abstract nature, may be elastic enough to incorporate the
ongoing discoveries, while the former may be too narrow to do so.
2.1 The Developmental Concept of the Organism
We’ll start our analysis with a more concrete and popular approach to defining organisms,
one which Gilbert et al. (2012) called the developmental concept of the organism.
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According to this concept, organisms are not fixed units but dynamic entities which
undergo a process of development from simple to more complex beings, such as those we
observe every day, e.g. cats or apes. Due to the developmental nature of organisms, we can
identify a point in space and time as the beginning of an organism and thus can distinguish
one organism from another. Usually this point is the fertilisation of an egg by sperm,
because this initiates a series of processes leading to the development of a mature, unique
organism that possesses sufficient biochemical machinery to produce more eggs and
sperm. Or, as Gilbert et al. (2012) put it more poetically, ‘the individual animal proposed
here is understood to be that which proceeds from ovum to ovum’. This way of thinking
about organisms is very popular among not only laymen (as many people believe that new
organisms, like members of our own species, start with the fertilisation of an egg by
sperm), but scholars too, as it is one of many ways of defining organisms (for an overview,
see Pepper and Herron 2008; Clarke 2010). For instance, Slack (2005, p. 6) writes,
‘[d]evelopment happens most obviously in the course of embryonic development as the
fertilised egg develops into a complete organism’, and Moore et al. (2016, p. 1) state that
‘[h]uman development begins at fertilisation when an oocyte (ovum) from a female is
fertilised by a sperm (spermatozoon) from a male. Development involves many changes
that transform a single cell, the zygote, into a multicellular human being.’ This concept of
the organism seems intuitive and easy to grasp; it may also seem to define organisms as
entities that develop from a fertilised egg. However, we believe that the foundations of this
concept are considerably more profound than they seem at first glance. Indeed, in our
opinion, the concept is essentially much broader. Therefore, we have to examine its
foundations in order to understand whether microbiomics undermines them. We believe
that two basic foundations of the developmental concept of organisms can be
distinguished.
Let’s start by discussing the first. To frame the discussion clearly, however, we should
first try to answer a simple question: what kind of observation led to the formulation of the
developmental concept of the organism? It should seem obvious that the idea of defining
the organism in this way derived from observations of how certain paradigms of organ-
isms, such as cats, apes, or humans, function and develop. The first thing that catches our
eye is that these organisms are built of millions of cells that are actively engaged in
maintaining the functional coherence and structure of the whole. In other words, they are
responsible for processing and assimilating external resources which enable the whole to
persist over time. For instance, a cat is made of cells that are well suited, by virtue of
division of labour (movement, digestion, etc.), to perform various actions in order to keep
the cat’s overall structure and functionality undisturbed. Another observation is that the
presence of these cells follows from the successive divisions of a zygote. Indeed, the idea
behind the developmental concept of organisms depends on the empirical fact that in many
species the cells that actively maintain the structure and functionality (such as the digestive
or nervous system) of the whole come from a zygote. The emerging concept is then based
on the conjecture that an organism is simply a set of cells that develops in the course of the
zygote’s divisions and that occupies a place within a complex network of various
interactions.
Thus, we know which observations lie behind the origin of the developmental concept
of the organism. Can we now, from these observations, deduce the foundations of this
concept? If we were to take these observations to a higher level of abstraction, we would
say that the foundations are that: (1) organisms are functionally integrated units that
actively maintain their structures, and (2) they are composed of elements linked by
common recent descent. In our opinion, according to the developmental concept,
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organisms are units that attain their full functionality through development from a certain
starting point. Indeed, the real idea behind this concept is that there must be a certain point
from which all functional elements of the organism ‘bloom’. Usually this is a zygote, as
many commonly studied species come into existence due to divisions of a fertilised egg, as
in the case of apes, cats, etc. However, we don’t see fertilisation of an egg as mandatory.
This is because functional wholes which actively maintain their structures can also come
into existence by starting from a different recent ancestor—for example, from partheno-
genesis, which is the process of development of an individual from an unfertilised egg,
producing genetically similar but functionally independent aphids, or from a simple split of
a human zygote leading to the development of two functionally independent monozygotic
twins.
In spite of these examples, we believe that our interpretation of the developmental
concept of organism is correct, because it takes the two observations that lie behind the
origin of this concept (as mentioned above) into account and extracts from them what, in
our opinion, constitutes their foundations. We affirm that a group of elements, in order to
be considered a developmental individual, must be functionally integrated and linked by
common recent descent (which may, but need not, involve a fertilised egg). This is the
interpretation of the developmental concept of the organism that we will work with here.2
Of course, cells linked by common descent (e.g. by coming from a zygote) are not the
only factors that contribute to the proper functionality of a given organism. Organisms
need many more things, such as food or the presence of certain aspects of the physical
environment, i.e. oxygen or surroundings of a suitable temperature. However, it is not
generally assumed that these things are parts of the organism. Why not? Let us address this
issue, since this seems necessary in order to properly evaluate the impact of microbiomics
on the concept in question. According to the developmental definition, an organism is a
network of functionally integrated cells linked by common descent. It can be understood as
a consortium consisting of elements that cooperate with one another in order to keep the
structure and functionality of the whole intact. Every function of such a whole is carried
out by cells derived from a common recent ancestor. The whole moves because some of
these cells have developed into muscle cells; it processes information from the environ-
ment because other cells have become nervous cells; it digests food because still other cells
have formed a digestive tract. Thus, its cells interact dynamically to keep the organism in
good shape. However, these cells do not work as a perpetuum mobile. In order to carry out
such diverse and complex functions, they require certain external resources, such as food to
provide energy or the proper temperature to obtain suitable conditions for the development
of certain tissues. The environment obviously contributes to the functionality of the
organism, but this contribution is rather passive. Elements of the environment provide
necessary ingredients for the organism’s cells; however, all of the organism’s functions are
still carried out by cells linked by common descent (e.g. through being derived from a
zygote), which merely need ‘fuel’ from outside. This statement makes the second foun-
dation of the developmental concept more explicit: there is a very clear distinction between
the organism and its environment. The former is a set of cells linked by common descent
and actively engaged in the maintenance of the organism’s function and structure, whereas
the latter is composed of all the remaining factors capable of influencing the functionality
2 It is worth noting that this is not the only possible interpretation; one might defend a different one, starting
from the same observations. For example, Janzen (1977) acknowledged the superior status of sexual over
other means of reproduction, arguing that the fertilisation of an egg is an organism’s real starting point;
moreover, he did not regard functional integration as essential.
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of the organism’s cells, from food and temperature to the presence of toxic proteins in
surrounding waters.
Now, how can we determine whether research on microbiomes is having a revolutionary
impact on this specific notion of an organism? In other words, what would prompt a
scientist to think that it’s about time to reject this idea and develop a new one? In the
context of what has already been said, it is becoming clear that we need some new data,
some premises demonstrating that the line between organisms and their environment is not
sharp, but rather fuzzy, thus forcing scientists to think of organisms in a more holistic way.
One way to test whether this is true in the context of microbiomics is to try to understand
the nature of this kind of research. However, to make our argument even more convincing
and to provide us with an element of contrast, we will first show why recent discoveries of
genetic diversity within multicellular organisms, though shocking and revolutionary, do
not themselves necessary suggest that we need to revise the developmental concept of the
organism.
For many years, the bodies of multicellular organisms were typically thought of as
genetically uniform. This view derived from a simple fact about multicellular organisms:
as species such as cats or humans develop from a zygote through mitotic divisions, they
should be genetically identical, since, during the process of mitosis, a cell is supposed to
transmit all of its genetic material to a descendant cell. Thus, theoretically, cells of
organisms that develop from a zygote should be considered genetic clones, and phenomena
such as cellular mutations—such as cancer or other diseases—should be considered
aberrations that disrupt the normal, uniform genetic structure of organisms. However,
recent progress in science has shown that genetic diversity within organisms should be
considered not as a negative exception that causes diseases, but rather as a common part of
their development (Westra et al. 2010; Frank 2014). For instance, many human neurons are
aneuploid; that is, they are prone to chromosomal abnormalities that lead to breaks, losses,
and duplications of genetic material (Westra et al. 2010). These discoveries are revolu-
tionising our understanding of genetic diversity within organisms—but do they force a
biologist using the developmental concept of the organism outlined above to reject it? We
are inclined to say ‘no’. All a biologist need do in such a case is simply argue that the
descendants of a zygote cell may mutate and generate diversity within an organism,
because this concept does not assume that an organism must be characterised by a specific
degree of genetic diversity. Therefore, these discoveries do not undermine the basic
assumption of the developmental concept, i.e. that the organism is a functional whole
linked by a common descent and that there is a sharp distinction between an organism and
its environment.
Now, let’s move on to what really interests us: the influence of microbiomics on the
concept being discussed. We can picture this by using an example to make the distinction
between microbiomics and discoveries such as the one described above clearer and more
vivid. In the developmental concept of the organism, things like the digestive system of
macrobes result from successive divisions of cells linked by common descent; these cells
undergo diversification, leading to the emergence of different types of tissue belonging to
various systems (nervous, digestive, etc.). For example, in cats, these cells derive from a
zygote, from which a multicellular organism starts to ‘bloom’. In this view, then, the
zygote contains everything necessary to form a functional digestive system in a cat, a
system enabling the cat to consume and assimilate food. In other words, the cells that build
up a cat’s digestive system are descendants of the zygote. Other cells found within the cat’s
digestive system are part of its environment: they either constitute the food that is being
digested, or derive from some pathogens that have infected the organism.
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Microbiomics, however, makes the situation much more complex. The more we know
about symbiotic microorganisms, the clearer it becomes that they are necessary for the
proper functioning of the digestive systems of many species of multicellular organisms.
One example is the rumen of a cow (Dehority 2003). The rumen, part of a cow’s digestive
system, is very important for its proper functioning, because it is where cellulose-con-
taining material (e.g. grass) is broken down into subunits of glucose that the cow can then
assimilate. This is possible thanks to microorganisms, maintained by cows in their rumens,
which produce an enzyme, cellulase, which enables them to break down cellulose. Another
similar example, though not as spectacular, comes from the species most familiar to us,
Homo sapiens. Though it may seem that our digestive system needs no microbial support,
since our diet includes very little cellulose-containing material (generally, we do not eat
grass), it seems that microbes are still extremely useful for the proper functionality of our
digestive system. For instance, without gut flora, we would not be able to utilise certain
polysaccharides such as fibres or starch, because normally these are dealt with by certain
microorganisms within the gut that produce specific enzymes (Clarke et al. 2014).
Now the question is: are these discoveries enough to force the ordinary biologist using
the developmental concept of the organism to seriously consider rejecting it? We believe
there are reasons to think so. To answer this question, and for the sake of clarity, suppose
now that we have a macrobe that develops from a fertilised egg and interacts with sym-
biotic microorganisms that perform a variety of different functions. Are these microor-
ganisms, as we said before, merely ‘fuel’, on a par with food or oxygen? The answer is
obviously not simple, and moreover would very likely vary for different symbiotic
microbes, since their roles might be extremely divergent (Douglas and Werren 2016;
Queller and Strasmann 2016). Perhaps for some of them it would be justified to say that
their role is similar to environmental factors (although this is debatable), because their
presence may provide a certain stimulus (similar to a reduced level of oxygen, high
temperature, etc.) and therefore activate certain functions of the organism’s cells. How-
ever, this is not always the case. What we want to say here is that at times the difference
between microbes and environmental factors may be quite substantial. There are various
circumstances in which microbes may perform functions necessary for the maintenance of
the structure and the functionality of the whole, functions which cannot be performed by
the macrobe’s cells alone. The most frequently cited examples concern digestive mecha-
nisms, which in many species can be carried out only with the assistance of suitable mi-
croorganisms. For instance, we know that cows cannot process food containing cellulose
without enzymes produced by microorganisms. Thus, microbes in such scenarios play an
essentially active role3 similar to that played by a macrobe’s cells derived from a zygote.
These microbes are responsible for processing and assimilating external resources, and
3 Microorganisms are not, of course, the only agents that may actively contribute to the maintenance and
functionality of macrobes. Macrobes may do this for each other as well. For instance, bees actively con-
tribute to the functionality of plants and vice versa. This raises a question: what is the difference between
macrobe–microbes and macrobe–macrobe interactions? We think that difference is rather qualitative than
quantitative. For example, since microbes inhabit a macrobe’s gut, they interact continuously with the
macrobe, whereas macrobes may interact in a more discontinuous way with other macrobes; they may meet
to exchange some goods, and then stop interacting for a while. This is, of course, just a speculative example
to show that, in our opinion, the differences are rather of a qualitative nature. Understanding the differences
and similarities between these two types of interactions is very interesting, but unfortunately beyond the
scope of this paper, as we are interested in analysing how macrobe–microbe interactions influence our
understanding of organisms. Javier Suárez, in his paper ’Framing the Holobiont: A Framework for the
Hologenome Concept of Evolution’ (under review), undertakes this task, i.e. an attempt to understand and
identify the differences between macrobe–microbe and macrobe–macrobe interactions.
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thus contribute to the undisturbed existence of the whole organism over time. Indeed, while
muscle cells are responsible for movement and thereby enable such a unit to look for food,
microbes may take part—along with macrobes’ digestive cells—in the digestive process.
Their role seems far more similar to that of the macrobe’s zygote-derived cells than to that
of external resources (e.g. oxygen, temperature). They are not just simply ‘stuff from the
outside’, processed and assimilated by the macrobe’s cells, but rather work together with
the macrobe’s cells to process and assimilate ‘stuff from the outside’, and thus enable the
whole to endure over time. This, in our opinion, shows that they should be considered part
of the organism rather than of its environment.
We believe that this, in turn, contradicts both foundations of the developmental concept
of the organism outlined earlier. First, it contradicts the primary assumption of the
developmental concept: that an organism is something that comes entirely from within, for
example, from a zygote. The truth is that, for many species of multicellular organisms,
something external, such as particular microbial cells from the environment, is also needed
to perform certain tasks (e.g. digestion). It should not surprise us that the developmental
concept has got it wrong by stating that cells linked by common descent (e.g. through
diversification of cells) alone are sufficient. After all, this concept was developed a long
time before the emergence of microbiomics; it might be attributed to Huxley (1852,
pp. 187–88), who wrote: ‘The individual animal is the sum of the phenomena presented by
a single life: in other words, it is all those forms which proceed from a single egg, taken
together’. Thus, it was impossible for those working within this paradigm to assume that
something external was needed, since the majority of empirical research had shown that
cats, apes, and dogs maintained their structure over time thanks to the active work carried
out by their zygote-derived cells. Furthermore, the fact that multicellular organisms must
incorporate objects from the environment contradicts the second assumption of the
developmental concept: mainly, that a sharp distinction exists between an organism and its
environment. In fact, the line is not drawn as sharply as we might think, since organisms of
many species achieve their full functionality not only through the diversification of cells
linked by common recent descent, but also through the acquisition of certain microbes
from their surroundings. We therefore agree with scholars (see Pradeu 2011; Gilbert et al.
2012) who argue that this concept of the organism is called into question by microbiomics.
2.2 The Cooperation–Conflict Concept of the Organism
The second concept we want to analyse is the concept of the organism developed by
Queller and Strasmann (2009). Basically, the authors argue that organisms should be
understood according to just two criteria: degree of cooperation and degree of conflict
among interacting elements. Thus, an organism is, in their view, a functional system built
of elements that cooperate to sustain its stability. Accordingly, the greater the degree of
cooperation and the lesser of conflict between elements of such a system, the greater the
organismality of the unit. To be an organism is thus, in light of the varying degrees of
cooperation and conflict among species in nature, a continuous variable. Indeed, some
combinations of units are highly organismal, because they are characterised by a high
degree of cooperation and a low degree of conflict: for example, a cat, built of cooperating
cells, might be described in this way. Alternatively, other combinations of units are not
organismal at all, as they are characterised only by a high level of conflict, the most
spectacular example being interactions between hosts and parasites.
Now let us ask: what is the most important part of this conceptualisation? It should be
clear that the core of this cooperation–conflict concept of the organism is as follows: to be
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an organism, a group of elements must be characterised by a high degree of cooperation
and a low level of conflict. But what do these terms really mean? According to the general
definition, cooperation refers to the possession of mechanisms that make a group of
elements a cohesive, functional whole. On the other hand, the term low level of conflict
refers to the possession of mechanisms which reduce potential conflict among elements in
an organism to a minimum. A conflict arises when an element within a group does not
behave so as to promote the functionality of the whole, but rather acts in a selfish manner,
to the detriment of the whole. Therefore, conflict-suppressing mechanisms are necessary in
order to exist as a functional and cohesive unit. To picture what these two kinds of
mechanisms look like in practice, let us provide an example: a cat, which we considered
earlier to be characterised by a high level of cooperation and a low level of conflict, making
it a paradigm of an organism in the evolutionary framework.
When we look at the body of a cat, we immediately realise that it is a group of cells
characterised by a high level of cooperation, to the extent that we intuitively consider it to
be a single unit (just as we do with other animals, e.g. apes or cows). This is because cats
belong to an evolutionary line that, in the course of evolution, has developed sophisticated
cooperative mechanisms which have transformed these cats into cohesive, functional
wholes. We find here cells of the digestive system responsible for the cat’s digestion of
food, muscle cells responsible for the cat’s movement, as well as nervous cells that enable
the cat to respond to environmental stimuli. Thus the group of cells making up the cat is a
highly cooperative union adapted to work as a functional whole. Nevertheless, there may
still be some room for the emergence of internal conflict. One example is cancer, which is
not limited to cats or animals, but which seems to be a kind of conflict common to all
multicellular organisms (see Aktipis et al. 2015). Basically, by cancer we mean a situation
in which a cell stops performing its normal functions (mainly due to mutations) and starts
to reproduce, at an uncontrolled rate, to the detriment of the organism, leading very often to
its death. However, the evolutionary line to which cats belong has developed mechanisms
that minimise the potential of such conflict. One such mechanism is a general division of
labour among cells that goes even further than the one mentioned above: division into
somatic and germ-line cells (Michod and Roze 1999). The former are responsible for the
cat’s survival, the latter for its reproduction. This sequestration reduces the potential for
conflict, because it reduces the chance of mutated somatic cells being transmitted to the
next generation. Thus it minimises the chance that cancer will emerge in the next gener-
ation (the more mutations a cell undergoes, the more likely it is that it will be transformed
into a cancer cell, although mutations alone are not always sufficient for cancer to emerge,
as there are other essential factors in play).
Now let us turn to microbiomics. Would the discoveries of microbiomics force a
biologist using this cooperation–conflict concept of organism to think of rejecting it? We
do not believe that microbiomics undermines the foundations of this conceptualisation,
which is flexible enough to permit us to think of a host and its symbiotic microorganisms as
a functional whole—an organism. This is true because this concept, rather than focusing on
any kind of phenotypic trait which would indicate organismality (such as common descent,
genetic uniqueness, etc.), instead uses the abstract terms cooperation and conflict, which
can be implemented differently by different units. Therefore, if a given combination of a
host and its symbiotic microorganisms fulfils the criteria of a high level of cooperation and
a low level of conflict, we can consider this combination to be an organism, because it has
evolved to the extent that its elements work in a coordinated way, and, furthermore, thanks
to some kind of adaptation, conflict between its elements has been minimalised. Is this true
in the case of interactions between symbiotic microorganisms and multicellular organisms?
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Queller and Strasmann (2016) argue that some host-microorganism combinations have
developed such a high level of cooperation and a low level of conflict that it would be
rational to consider them as a kind of multi-species organism. One such case is exemplified
by aphids and their symbiotic bacteria Buchnera sp. (Baumann 2005). These bacteria are
not picked up from the environment, but are transmitted between aphid generations
through special propagules called bacteriocytes during early development. Therefore, the
relationship has reached the point that the two parties have lost their autonomy and become
one complex unit; together, they function in a coordinated, interdependent way. The
bacteria obtain protection and, in exchange, synthesise the amino acids lacking in the
aphids’ diet. Besides a high level of cooperation, other things exist as well which reduce
conflict between the elements of this combination to a minimum. One such thing, among
many, is drastic reduction of the bacterial genome (McCutcheon and Moran 2012). Many
genes have been lost in the course of the bacteria’s evolution, which means that fewer
genes can be brought to bear in conflicts (the existence of fewer genes equates to a reduced
probability that one of them will mutate and harm the aphid). Thus, it makes sense to say
that such a combination scores high on the scale of organismality.
Unfortunately, as one might suppose, not all interactions between multicellular
organisms and symbiotic microorganisms would do as well on the scale of organismality.
For instance, certain bacterial pathogens currently subject to intensive medical studies,
such as Helicobacter pylori or Vibrio cholerae (see Pan et al. 2014), have a detrimental
impact on the human body; thus, in the case of such interactions, there is not much
cooperation and a great deal of conflict. However, between pathogens and well-suited
combinations such as aphids and Buchnera are numerous intermediate states of organis-
mality, since the whole concept is not absolute but measured by degrees; the most obvious
cases (cats, apes and so on) evolved from organisms that, perhaps millions of years ago,
were characterised by a very low (or average) level of cohesion and interdependence
among elements. Currently, it is likely that many interactions between microbes and
multicellular organisms represent such an intermediate level of organismality. For
instance, in the case of symbiotic bacteria living within the human gut, we indeed benefit
from some kind of cooperation, because our (the host’s) immune system tolerates them and
they are engaged in the functioning of our immune and digestive system (Ley et al. 2008).
However, there is some room for conflict between them as well, because these relation-
ships are not as fixed as in the case of aphids and Buchnera; for instance, the diet of the
host might change the composition and abundance of symbiotic microbes (David et al.
2014); what is more, the majority of symbiotic microbes could live just as well outside the
host (Ley et al. 2006, 2008). Thus, as their reproductive successes are not very strongly
linked, one might expect that if some factors were to change, some microbes might, for
instance, ‘decide’ to reproduce faster at the expense of the host. This should not surprise us,
as similar shifts from cooperation to defection occur quite often in nature as factors such as
availability of resources change (Hoek et al. 2016).
The cooperation–conflict concept of the organism, in the context of the preceding
considerations, demonstrates the very complex nature of holobionts. Holobionts are not
unified objects, because they exhibit varying levels of cooperation and conflict between
hosts and microbes. Indeed, as we showed in the last few paragraphs, only certain com-
binations of host and symbiotic microbes are characterised by such a high level of
cooperation and low level of conflict that we can consider them examples of proper
organismality. Therefore, in the context of the cooperation–conflict concept of the
organism, it is not really justified to argue that a host and all of its symbiotic microor-
ganisms constitute a good example of a highly organismal entity. Rather, this can be said
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about only a very small number of symbiotic microbes. This raises a number of inter-
esting—both philosophically and scientifically—questions. What factors favour coopera-
tion between hosts and microbes? Through what physiological mechanisms is cooperation
between microbes and hosts sustained? Are these mechanisms the same across all species?
How are conflicts of interest resolved? These and many other questions will be definitely
addressed in the next years by scholars, since they appear to be necessary in order to gain a
deeper understanding of the factors that make a host and microbes an organism in the
context of the cooperation–conflict concept of the organism.
The cooperation–conflict concept of organism seem to cope well with the ongoing
discoveries of microbiomics. Indeed, it seems that these discoveries are not at all revo-
lutionary from the perspective of this (as opposed to the developmental) conceptualisation.
Moreover, the assumptions of this theory enable us to easily incorporate these recent
discoveries. Scientists working within this framework would say that what is really going
on right now is simply a gradual accumulation of new data—data that are expanding our
understanding of elements that might group together to form cooperative unions. Inter-
estingly, these may include not only cells from the division of zygotes, but also bacterial
cells from the environment that can be incorporated into organisms. Indeed, from the
perspective of this conceptualisation of the organism, the discoveries of microbiomics
demonstrate new ways of interacting among cooperative elements without undermining the
foundations of the whole idea. Thus, for people working within this framework, it is far
from true that their understanding of the organism is changing. There are only ordinary
discoveries of new interactions among elements that constitute organisms.
3 Making Sense of the Results
Let us summarise some of the main points we made in the last section. Biologists have not
developed a concept of the organism that would be universally accepted; rather, within
biology, alternative definitions exist. Furthermore, the differences between various con-
ceptualisations are not merely cosmetic, but (as we have shown based on two analysed
concepts) fundamental. Specifically, these differences influence the way a given concep-
tualisation deals with current discoveries in the field of microbiomics. Some concepts
which, for certain reasons, are unable to explain and incorporate the results of the ongoing
discoveries of microbiomics must be rejected, while others are flexible enough to do so
quite easily. This assures us that the current impact of microbiomics has a local character.
Only some conceptualisations of the organism must be rejected.
So far we have argued that microbiomics has an irregular impact on the understanding
of organisms across biology. However, this is only a raw analysis of the issue. To get a
more comprehensive picture of the influence of microbiomics on the concept of the
organism, we have to take a closer look into its nature. There are two basic questions that
should be asked in order to make this clear. Firstly, why there are so many co-existing
concepts of the organism? Secondly, can answering this question help to explain why some
concepts deal with microbiomics better than others?
Why are there so many concepts of the organism? The very basic answer to this
question is that living things are very complex and it would be hard to develop a concept of
the organism applicable to different objects, such as social insects, humans, bacteria,
plants, and fungi. This is because, despite a consensus among scientists that an organism is
a kind of functional, cohesive whole (Pepper and Herron 2008; Queller and Strasmann
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2009; Clarke 2010), when it comes to setting boundaries between organisms in nature the
issue becomes much more complex. It is not so easy to choose criteria that would fit all
species. Therefore, one might think that what really has to be done to solve this problem is
to elaborate on the concept of the organism, resulting in the development of one that would
be general enough to be used by scientists to study different taxa. Indeed, many such
attempts have been recently put forward (see Korzeniewski 2001; Queller and Strasmann
2009; Clarke 2013).
However, there is a basic problem with this approach: mainly, that it presupposes only
one proper way of picking out individuals in nature. Indeed, following the logic of the
previous paragraph, one might easily reach the conclusion that there is one universal
concept of the organism waiting to be discovered by a prominent philosopher or scientist
and thus we just have to wait until someone develops it. But is it really true that there is
only one ‘right’ way to differentiate individuals? In other words, can scientists favour one
way of individuating objects over others based on some sort of rational choice? If true, this
would mean that we should prioritise one approach which somehow does a better job of
capturing the ‘essence’ of being an individual. An obvious candidate for this would be the
theory of evolution by natural selection, which is the theory that unifies biology.
Recently many scholars have defended a different position, one which we think explains
the existence of multiple conceptualisations of the organism in an elegant manner. Namely,
they have suggested that the priority of a single concept need not necessarily apply within
biology (see Pepper and Herron 2008; Dupré and O’Malley 2009; Kovaka 2015; Pradeu
2016). As an alternative, a pluralistic approach might be a good way to individuate
organisms, since there may be more than one way to single out individuals. Scientists
might choose to use a concept of the organism based on their research aims. In other words,
when scientists change the aim of their research, they may also change their criteria for
individualisation—which basically means that what dictates the individualisation of
objects by biologists is scientific practice. Let’s consider some examples in order to make
this much clearer.
It would not be controversial to say that the developmental concept of the organism is
very popular in the study of development of animals (Slack 2005, p. 6; Pradeu 2011;
Moore et al. 2016, p. 1). The explanation for this is quite obvious. Generally, develop-
mental biologists studying animals are interested in understanding how such complex
things as an eye, a digestive system, etc., develop from a fertilised egg. To perform this
task, they follow the paths of cells undergoing division and their diversification and try to
identify the factors responsible for this, manipulating external factors such as salinity,
temperature, diet, etc. in order to observe how they influence the development of particular
animals. Therefore, the application of the developmental concept appears to be a really
good choice for this kind of research, since it is congruent with scientific practice con-
ducted within the field of developmental biology. On one hand we have a concrete, defined
organism which is the object of our inquiry: a set of interacting cells that arises as an effect
of the successive divisions of a zygote. On the other hand, we have external elements
which we can manipulate to monitor changes in development of organisms.
This concept, however, becomes problematic when we try to use it for other purposes.
For example, if we are interested in research concerning species as different as flowers,
aphids, and bacteria at the same time, then perhaps a more abstract concept of the organism
is appropriate, such as the cooperation–conflict concept of the organism (Queller and
Strasmann 2009, 2016; Strassmann and Queller 2010), since this concept is general enough
to be easily applied to different species. This feature makes the concept very useful, for
instance, in comparative studies between species, as it provides an abstract, theoretical
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framework within which to organise such an interspecies analysis. For instance, if we want
to understand whether biofilms (packed communities of bacterial cells) are as well inte-
grated as multicellular organisms, we might ask what level of cooperation and conflict
characterises the former compared to the latter. This might help us to understand the
differences and similarities between them and, therefore, to draw more justified
conclusions.
However, both of these concepts might prove useless for other scientific aims. For
instance, for a palaeontologist working in the field, it is more comfortable to focus on
anatomical indicators of individuality (such as bones) than on aspects such as common
descent or abstract terms of cooperation and conflict. Indeed, when a palaeontologist deals
with bones, it is not always known whether his or her object of study developed from a
fertilised egg, or whether it possessed effective mechanisms of suppressing internal con-
flicts; thus it would be hard to apply one of the above-mentioned concepts here in order to
single out individuals from the remains of organisms. This kind of scientist would prefer to
use some kind of anatomical concept, one which considers an organism as an anatomical
whole. According to such an approach, a set of bones would constitute one organism if it
makes up, from an anatomical point of view, a functional and cohesive whole. For
example, a palaeontologist would link ‘tibia A’ and ‘femur B’ if he or she saw that both
were capable of interacting in a functional manner, thus suggesting that they are part of the
same whole. Therefore, a set of bones would be called an organism not because of some
observable mechanism, but because the bones visibly seem to make up an anatomically
functional whole.
These examples show that what actually determines the choice of a concept of the
organism is its usefulness in certain research procedures. This should not seem surprising if
we look at the way biological sciences are organised. Biology is an extremely decentralised
science, encompassing many different subfields. Scientists working in these areas of
research have often developed their own procedures, created their own conferences,
journals, etc.; this mirrors the fact that they are interested in studying different aspects of
the biological world. This diversity of scientific goals often requires different tools and
methodologies, something that obviously influences the way particular objects of inquiry
are conceptualised. This can be clearly observed in the case of concepts of the organism, as
we have shown in the last few paragraphs. For different scientific aims, biologists tend to
define organisms in different ways, depending on the usefulness of the definition in
comparison to other concepts. Thus, it seems that the co-existence of so many different
concepts of the organism in biology is caused by the fact that scientists may conceptualise
individuals in different ways for different purposes.
Can this help us explain why microbiomics is making such an irregular impact on the
concepts of the organism used by biologists? In other words, can this help us explain why
some concepts can deal with discoveries of microbiomics, while others cannot? We think
so. This will become clear the moment we realise what it really means when we say that
scientific practice dictates the choice of the concept of the organism. Different scientific
purposes require different concepts, because scientists do different things, and thus can
make different assumptions about organisms. If we study just one species, for example
cats, we do not need to define organisms in a way that captures organismality in, let’s say,
biofilms. Indeed, while conducting our cat-based research we are not really interested in
other species; therefore we can define organisms very narrowly, for example, by referring
to more concrete traits that are good indicators of organismality in this species (such as
common descent, genetics uniqueness, etc.). However, if we are conducting a comparative
study covering many different species, we’ll use a concept of the organism that can be
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applied to all of them. Such studies require a more abstract, general concept, such as
cooperation–conflict, because we want to apply it to many different species. Therefore,
using ideas of a general nature is not always necessary. Rather, it seems that in some cases
it is justified to use a narrow concept, while in others it is necessary to assume a broader,
more general idea, if it is more suitable for the purposes of particular research.
That scientists sometimes define organisms more broadly and other times more nar-
rowly is, in our opinion, the main reason for the local character of the influence of
microbiomics on the concepts of the organism. Why do we think so? Because we believe
that narrowly-defined concepts (e.g. those referring to more concrete things, such as
common descent or genetic uniqueness) are more likely to be rejected when new dis-
coveries emerge. This is because they are based on more concrete, area-dependent
assumptions and thus it is more likely that new discoveries will prove them wrong. On the
other hand, concepts based on more abstract terms are more likely to be immune to novel
discoveries, as they are more independent of particular research areas. Although it may
turn out eventually that part of our knowledge about organisms is misguided, this will not
necessary lead to the rejection of such a concept, since new discoveries may also indicate
that the functionality of organisms is carried out in different ways. This explains why, for
the purposes of this paper, we have chosen the developmental and the cooperation–conflict
concepts of the organism: the first is defined in a narrow, a more concrete way, the second
one in a broader and more abstract manner. We suspect that, due to this significant
dissimilarity, they will respond differently to ongoing discoveries and thus show that the
current influence of microbiomics on concepts of the organism has a local character.
This, actually, is what we have shown in the previous section. The developmental
concept was unable to deal with microbiomic research, while the cooperation concept of
organism had no problems with it. This was because the assumptions on which the former
is based are more concrete, while those of the latter are based on abstract terms of co-
operation and conflict; microbiomics merely introduces new kinds of co-operative inter-
actions among elements. Even though we have analysed only two concepts, there are good
reasons to think that the same irregularity may concern other concepts of the organism.
This is because the developmental concept is not the only one that rests on specific
assumptions; there are others that make such assumptions (examples include genetic
structure and spatial boundaries), and research on microbiomics might force us to revise
them. Other concepts, however, may be broad enough to deal with microbiomics (see
Dupré and O’Malley 2009; Godfrey-Smith 2013; Moran and Sloan 2015; Douglas and
Werren 2016; Pradeu 2016). For instance, Dupré and O’Malley (2009) use the concept of
the interactor to show how to properly understand interactions between macrobes and
microbes. Therefore, they have shown that the existing concepts of individuals are broad
and flexible enough to be used to understand the results of research on microbiomics.
Bearing in mind this specific nature of the concept of the organism within biology, we
can now fully understand why microbiomics has a local influence on the concepts of
organism. Biology is a very broad science, and researchers choose various research sub-
jects, from the biodiversity of tropical forests to the diversity of cat populations to the very
nature of DNA replication. For some of these scientific aims, narrow conceptualisations of
the organism are sufficient. For example, if one studies the development of cats, then the
developmental conceptualisation of the organism would be a good choice: it enables
scientists to distinguish one cat from another and is easy to apply in the laboratory. For
other scientific problems, however, a more abstract concept would be better, especially for
someone interested in studying many different species. Thus biology contains many dif-
ferent conceptualisations of organisms. Research on microbiomes, while spectacular,
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makes such an impact on certain concepts that the scientists using them are forced to revise
them. Those concepts which are more likely to experience the impact of microbiomes are
those defined in a very narrow, concrete way, because they are based on more concrete
assumptions and new discoveries are more likely to invalidate those assumptions. This is,
perhaps, what researchers studying the development of animals have to do, because it
seems that understanding the development of their object of study is impossible without
taking symbiotic microbes into consideration and thus shifting from the developmental
concept of the organism to a more holistic definition (see Pradeu 2011). On the other hand,
many other scientists would regard research on microbiomes as an interesting nuance and
would not feel impelled to revise their concept of the organism, because the concept they
use is broad enough to incorporate the results of research on microbiomes.
This raises an interesting question. Will the fact that some concepts can cope better with
the discoveries of microbiomics lead to a situation where scientists switch en masse to
more flexible concepts? For example, we showed that the co-operation-conflict concept can
incorporate the latest results of microbiomic research, whereas the developmental concept
of organism is incapable of doing so. Does it mean that scientists will now, after reading
our paper, switch to the new concept? It may seem that way. As we said in the last
paragraph, those using the developmental concept of the organism may need a more
holistic one, and the co-operation-conflict concept looks like a good candidate. We think,
though, that this is very unlikely. If a scientist has studied some aspects of human biology
using the developmental concept of the organism and now, for some reason, must incor-
porate microbiomics into his research and consequently reject the developmental approach,
it is unlikely that he’ll switch to the co-operation-conflict concept of organism. This
concept is so broad that it enables us to speak about the organismality of plants and bees
(Queller and Strasmann 2009, 2016; Strassmann and Queller 2010); however, our scientist
has no need of such an idea. Rather, he simply needs to understand the place of microbes in
the case of individuality of humans. Thus, he will very likely develop a concept that will
transcend the developmental one by simply adding information on microbes, one that will
suit his research process very well, as nicely expressed by Sleator (2010) at the beginning
of this paper: ‘‘For years our traditional view of ‘self’ was restricted to our own bodies,
composed of eukaryote cells encoded by our genome. However, in the era of omic tech-
nologies and systems biology, this view now extends beyond the traditional limitations of
our own core being to include our resident microbial communities.’’ This shows, in our
opinion, that the ‘microbiomic revolution’ does not lead to conceptual unity, i.e. is not a
step toward a unified concept of the organism. The ‘‘organismal landmark’’ present within
biology will not change. Prior to the emergence of microbiomics, many concepts of the
organism existed, and after microbiomics many will continue to exist. Only certain sci-
entists will have to reformulate the concept they use. This should not be controversial.
After all, if the concept of the individual depends on scientific practice and there is no unity
of practice within biology, why should we expect unity in conceptualisation?
4 Concluding Remarks
Understanding how research on microbiomics is changing biology has recently been one of
the topics in biology most frequently debated by both philosophers and biologists, espe-
cially the analysis of the concept of the organism (Dupré and O’Malley 2009; Gilbert et al.
2012; Pradeu 2016). In this paper we have presented a novel perspective on this subject,
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according to which the various conceptualisations respond differently to ongoing discov-
eries; thus, change in the understanding of organisms in biology is local, constrained to
certain concepts of the organism which cannot manage to incorporate the ongoing dis-
coveries. This does not, of course, diminish the outstanding discoveries of microbiomics.
Rather, it shows that biology as a scientific field is very complex and divided into many
subfields; scientists working within one field might conceptualise their objects of inquiry in
a different manner than those working within another. Nor does this concern only the
concept of the organism, as conceptual pluralism applies as well to other concepts used by
scientists, e.g. species (Dupré 1999; Suárez 2015) or population (Stegenga 2016). There-
fore, it is very likely that microbiomics will influence each variant of such a concept in a
different way and thus lead as well to local changes. But is conceptual pluralism applied
universally? In other words, does this mean that biology is the kind of science that always
permits its practitioners to have many alternative definitions of a given concept? We do not
think that this is in fact true. For instance, within biology there is only one concept of DNA
(Brown 2006), and its rejection would very likely lead to rearrangement of the entire field.
Therefore, it is very possible that research on microbiomics will make different impacts on
different concepts in biology. For example, sometimes it may lead to local changes; other
times, if it undermines a concept that is very well grounded within all subfields of biology,
it may lead to complete rearrangement. Our contribution to understanding the influence of
microbiomics was to show that, at least in the case of concepts of the organism, we are
dealing with local changes. We hope that this new perspective will enrich our under-
standing of the current transformation of biology by microbiomics. Furthermore, we hope
that it will also enhance the mutual understanding of scientists working in different fields.
The fact that novel discoveries seem not to challenge the basic concepts of a given scientist
does not necessarily mean that they will not challenge those of other scientists, who may
individuate things like organisms, genes, populations, species, etc., in a different way and
thus feel the impact of novel discoveries in a different manner.
Acknowledgements We thank Jerzy Gołosz and Josef Ulatowski for their useful remarks on the earlier
versions of the paper as well as the two anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of our manuscript and
their insightful comments and suggestions. We thank also Javier Suárez and John Dupré for the fruitful
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